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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ; 
BRIAN EUGENE HUMPHREY, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
) APPELLANT'S 
) OPENING BRIEF 
1 Priority No. 2 
) Lower Court No. 9517-12 
) Ct. App. No. 960069-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for Possession With Intent to 
Distribute Methamphetamine, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(ii) (1995), and Possession of a Dangerous Weapon, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1995). This Court obtains jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was Trooper Eldredge reasonably justified in stopping Humphrey's vehicle 
for committing a traffic violation or for suspicion of using and/or transporting controlled 
substances? 
2. Was Trooper Eldredge justified in further detaining and questioning 
Humphrey after the legitimate reason, if any, for the initial stop had dissipated? 
Standard of Appellate Review 
This Court reviews a district court's factual findings on a motion to suppress 
evidence for clear error. However, the ultimate legal conclusions based on the underlying facts, 
such as whether a stop was supported by reasonable suspicion or whether a stop was 
unreasonably prolonged ("scope of detention") are reviewed de novo, for correction of error. 
See State v. Ziegleman, 905 P.2d 883, 885 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 
586 (Utah Ct. App.) cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994); State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 
652 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). See also 
State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah 1996); State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 
(Utah 1995); State v. Chapman, _ P.2d _ , No. 930026, slip op. (Utah, July 19, 1996); State 
v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994); State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 1994); 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270-71 (Utah 
1993). 
2 
Preservation of Issues and Propriety of Review 
These issues were raised in the court below, ruled upon by the court, and properly 
preserved for appellate review. See R.27,38 (Motion and Order to Continue Suppression 
Hearing); R. 170-74 (counsel delineating grounds for suppression); R. 184-88 (trial court ruling 
on suppression motion); R. 69-70 (Defendant's Sery plea preserving right to appeal denial of 
suppression motion). See also infra note 1. If the Court finds that previous counsel failed to 
properly raise either of the two issues above, the Court should apply the plain error doctrine. 
Utah R. Evid. 103(d); State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35-36 & nn. 7-12 (Utah), cert, denied, 
493 U.S. 814, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
3 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-118 (1995): 
(a) Every vehicle upon a highway within this state at any time from a half 
hour after sunset to a half hour before sunrise and at any other time when, 
due to insufficient light or unfavorable atmospheric conditions, persons and 
vehicles on the highway are not clearly discernible at a distance of 1,000 
feet ahead shall display lighted lamps and other lamps and illuminating 
devices as respectively required for different classes of vehicles, subject 
to exceptions with respect to parked vehicles, and further that stop lights, 
turn signals and other signaling devices shall be lighted as prescribed for 
the use of such devices. 
(b) Whenever requirement is hereinafter declared as to distance from which 
certain lamps and devices shall render objects visible or within which such 
lamps or devices shall be visible, said provisions shall apply during the 
times stated in Subsection (a) in respect to a vehicle without load when 
upon a straight, level, unlighted highway under normal atmospheric 
conditions, unless a different time or condition is expressly stated. 
(c) Whenever requirement is hereinafter declared as to the mounted height of 
lamps or devices it shall mean from the center of such lamp or device to 
the level ground upon which the vehicle stands when such vehicle is 
without a load. 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1995): 
It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally to distribute a controlled 
or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance; 
4 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-10-503(1)(a) (1995): 
(1) (a) 
(b) 
A. Nature of the Case 
I 
Humphrey was charged in a Ten-Count Amended Information filed January 27, 
1995, alleging various violation of Utah Controlled Substances Act (R.4-6). On February 27, 
1995, the State filed a Second Amended Information against Humphrey alleging essentially the 
same offenses as in the Amended Information (R. 18-20). Subsequently, previous counsel 
apparently moved to suppress evidence of the warrantless search conducted on Humphrey,1 and 
thereafter filed a Motion to Suppress Search Warrant and Evidence (R.59). 
1
 The record does not disclose a written motion to suppress. However, on March 23, 
1995, the court entered an order continuing the hearing on the motion to suppress. See 
R.29. The court also held a suppression hearing and eventually denied the motion. See 
R.188. Accordingly, the denial of the motion to suppress is properly before this Court. 
State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 265-66 (Utah 1992); State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 
1053 (Utah 1991). 
5 
Any person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under 
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other state, 
government, or country, or who is addicted to the use of any 
narcotic drug, or who has been declared mentally incompetent may 
not own or have in his possession or under his custody or control 
any dangerous weapon as defined in this part. 
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-
off shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
B* Course of Proceedings 
On July 25, 1995, the court denied Humphrey's motion to suppress the evidence 
(R.188).2 Humphrey thereafter entered a Sery3 plea to Counts I and IV of the Second 
Amended Information, the counts alleging possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine 
and possession of a firearm (R.62-70). In return, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining 
counts (R.89). 
C. Disposition in Trial Court 
Humphrey was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of one 
to fifteen years on Count I and zero to five years on Count II. The sentences are to run 
concurrently (R.89-90) (attached as Addendum I), but were temporarily suspended pending this 
appeal, pursuant to a certificate of probable cause. See R.96-97. 
D. Statement of the Facts 
On January 24, 1995, at approximately 1:12 p.m., Trooper Rick Eldredge 
("Trooper Eldredge") of the Utah Highway Patrol stopped a red Pontiac Fierro being driven by 
Humphrey on State Road 191, about twenty miles north of Monticello, Utah (R. 107,138,141). 
There was only one passenger in the car, Ms. Nicki Peterson ("Nicki") (R.108). The initial 
2
 The trial court's oral factual findings and conclusions of law are excerpted and attached 
to this Brief as Addendum II. 
3
 State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). See also State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 
890, 892 (Utah 1993). 
6 
reasons for stopping the Fierro were Trooper Eldredge's suspicion that the vehicle contained 
drugs and the occupants had invoked their constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and 
seizures when they were pulled over by another officer one hour earlier ("first stop") (R.134-
135). 
Prior to the second stop, Trooper Eldredge had overheard Troopers Ken Collier 
and Andy Peterson over the police radio. Trooper Collier related how he made the first stop 
in Bluff, Utah, because the Fierro had no front license plate. At that time the driver, Nicki, had 
consented to the search of the Fierro but Humphrey implored her not to allow trooper Collier 
to conduct a warrantless search. The trooper then cited Nicki for no front license plate and 
allowed the couple to proceed on their journey (R. 108). Based on what trooper Collier told him, 
trooper Peterson, Nicki's father, said the Fierro should have been searched for drugs because 
Nicki had been using methamphetamines (R.129). 
Trooper Peterson thereafter called trooper Eldredge and told Eldredge to meet him 
at Crescent Junction, Utah (R.109). When they met, trooper Peterson again related that Nicki 
had been using methamphetamines and she is being supplied the controlled substance by a Brad 
Davis (R. 110,131). He also told trooper Eldredge that a Grand Junction, Colorado, police 
officer had told him that some methamphetamine labs were raided two months earlier and Brad 
Davis' name had come up, and he believed that Nicki had been transporting drugs (R.111). 
Trooper Peterson concluded the conversation stating that he knew drugs would be found in the 
Fierro if searched (R.112). 
7 
Trooper Eldredge then contacted trooper Collier, who related that he had pulled 
the Fierro over for no license plate and that Nicki had consented to a search but Humphrey told 
her to deny him consent to search (R. 113). After this conversation, trooper Eldredge proceeded 
southbound to try to intercept the Fierro (R.114). At about milepost 194, the trooper 
encountered the Fierro, which was travelling southbound at approximately sixty miles per hour 
with its headlights on, no front license plate and no tail lights (R.114). The trooper turned 
around and followed the Fierro, bent on stopping it for drug trafficking suspicion (R.114). 
Upon being pulled over, Humphrey produced his driver's license in the name of 
Brad Davis and Nicki produced a citation indicating she had just been cited by trooper Collier 
for the license plate violation (R. 115). At this time, the trooper ordered Nicki out of the Fierro 
and into his vehicle to question her about controlled substances (R. 115,142). He then asked for, 
but she refused, consent to search. The trooper also ran Humphrey's driver's license for 
possible outstanding warrants (R.116). The dispatch advised trooper Eldredge that there were 
no holds on Humphrey, Nicki or the Fierro (R. 143-45). Further, no warning or citation was 
issued to either Humphrey or Nicki (R.144). 
Thereafter, the trooper radioed his superior, Sergeant Hall, about the possibility 
of obtaining a warrant to search the Fierro. Sergeant Hall responded that there was insufficient 
information to get a warrant, but that they did have sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain the 
couple until a drug sniffing dog is located (R. 117). By this time, approximately six minutes had 
elapsed between the stop and the conversation with Sergeant Hall (R.117), 
8 
Shortly thereafter, trooper Eldredge left his car and went to the Fierro to question 
Humphrey about controlled substances and his alias (R. 118,145). Nicki followed the trooper 
to the Fierro, explaining that she was cold and needed a coat. Unable to locate Nicki's jacket 
inside the vehicle, Humphrey offered to hand her his jacket. When the trooper gave his 
approval, Humphrey exited the Fierro, lifted the driver's seat and pulled out a black leather 
jacket which he handed to trooper Eldredge. At this point, the trooper padded down the jacket 
and felt a bulky item, which turned out to be a prescription bottle containing Zylocane (R.118). 
The bottle, however, had no name on it (R. 118). Upon being questioned separately, Humphrey 
said he found the Zylocane in an alley way and Nicki claimed the prescription belonged a friend 
who was using it to treat cancer (R.119). 
The trooper proceeded to give Humphrey a field sobriety test called "internal 
clock,"4 which he believed Humphrey "failed" (R.120). Humphrey was then arrested for 
driving under the influence (R.122). Sergeant Hall thereafter appeared on the scene, 
approximately twenty-one minutes after the stop (R.122). Trooper Eldredge and Sergeant Hall 
again discussed getting a drug sniffing dog. Approximately forty minutes later, Deputy John 
4
 As the trooper rudimentarily explained the test, "everybody has what we call an 
internal clock. Stimulants will normally speed that clock up; depressants will normally slow 
that clock down. . . . [W]hat you do is is you have the person tilt his head back and estimate 
thirty seconds, and then you asked them how they did that. I asked Mr. Humphreys to do 
that, and he estimated thirty seconds in seventeen seconds, which . . . made me believe his 
internal clock was running a little faster than it should be." R.120. 
9 
McGann arrived on the scene with a dog (R. 123). The dog alerted to drugs and a search of the 
Fierro revealed controlled substances (R.124). 
Subsequently, Humphrey was charged with various drug-related offenses 
(R. 1,4,18). A hearing was held July 25, 1995, and Humphrey's suppression motion was denied 
(R.188). Humphrey then entered a conditional ("S^ry") plea to two counts in the Information; 
the others were dismissed (R.62-70). On January 19, 1996, the court sentenced Humphrey to 
the Utah State Prison for concurrent terms of one to fifteen and zero to five years (R. 89-90). 
The sentences, however, were stayed pending resolution of this appeal (R.96). Subsequently, 
a notice of appeal was timely filed with the court below (R.91). There are no prior or related 
appeals in this matter. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court found that Humphrey was properly stopped for committing several 
traffic violations. Those findings are clearly erroneous. No probative evidence was introduced 
suggesting that Humphrey was speeding or that his tail lights were malfunctioning at the time 
of the second stop. Further, the alleged license plate violation was clearly a subterfuge, because 
trooper Eldredge was aware that the Fierro had just been cited one hour earlier for the same 
violation. Accordingly, Humphrey had not committed any traffic violation warranting the 
seizure of his person and vehicle. In addition, the information provided trooper Eldredge by 
trooper Peterson does not rise to the level of "reasonable suspicion" to stop Humphrey's vehicle. 
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Moreover, the trooper did not independently verify the information. Accordingly, the trial court 
committed reversible error in concluding that the seizure was a lawful drug stop. 
Even if the initial stop for traffic violations was justified at its inception, 
Humphrey was unreasonably detained at the point the trooper obtained information that there 
were no outstanding warrant's for Humphrey and/or the Fierro. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SEIZURE AND DETENTION OF HUMPHREY WAS UNREASONABLE 
UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. 
The United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court have held that the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit the State from 
conducting unreasonable searches and seizures during a routine traffic stop. United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979); Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131. Accord Bello, 871 P.2d at 586. 
See also Utah Const, art. 1, § 14. Therefore, trooper Eldredge's stop of the Fierro is 
constitutionally permissible only if (1) his action was reasonably justified at its inception and (2) 
"the resulting detention was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first place." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968)); accord State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
11 
A. Humphrey had not committed a traffic offense prior to the stop and the trooper's 
decision to stop the Fierro was not based on reasonable suspicion.. 
To analyze the first prong of the dual Fourth Amendment inquiry, i.e., whether 
a stop is justified at its inception, this Court first asks whether a traffic violation occurred in the 
presence of the officer. The inquiry ends if the answer is affirmative, because an officer is 
always justified in stopping a motorist for a traffic violation committed in his presence. If the 
answer is negative, then this Court asks whether the officer had articulable suspicion for the 
stop. See State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 224 nn.2 & 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Phrased 
differently, a police officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a motorist for a traffic 
violation committed in his presence or if the officer reasonably believes the motorist is 
committing one of the multitude of traffic laws. See Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1132; State v. Dietrnan, 
739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987); Bella, 871 P.2d at 586; Talbot, 792 P.2d at 491. See 
generally Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1995) (authorizing police seizure of a person in a public 
place upon reasonable suspicion of a crime). 
In this case, trooper Eldredge testified that the primary reason for stopping 
Humphrey was to inquire about drug possession and/or transportation. See R. 134, 138 ("I was 
originally stopping them for the controlled substances . . ."). However, he also said the Fierro 
was ostensibly pulled over for missing the front license plate and tail lights. R. 114-115. 
Nevertheless, as the trial court correctly pointed out, the legality of a stop turns on the objective 
facts confronting the officer at the time of the stop, rather than the justification the officer 
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articulated thereafter. See R.174. See also Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1137 (citing United States v. 
Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 213 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 833, 108 S. Ct. 110 (1987) & 
id. at 1137 n.6). 
The trial court found that trooper Eldredge stopped Humphrey for, among others, 
speeding and missing the front license plate and a tail light. R.174. The court then concluded 
that the trooper was reasonably justified in seizing Humphrey. See R.175. 
Nothing in the record, however, demonstrates that Humphrey was speeding.5 
Although the trooper stated that Humphrey was driving sixty miles per hour when initially 
encountered, he never testified that Humphrey was speeding or travelling beyond the speed limit. 
See R.114. Cf. State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 702 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (speeding justifies 
traffic stop). The State introduced no evidence on the speed limit on State Road 191. Nor did 
the trial court take judicial notice of the speed limit. See Utah R. Evid. 201. Accordingly, the 
trial court clearly erred in finding that Humphrey was pulled over for speeding. See Pena, 869 
P.2d at 935-36 (to find clear error appellate court must determine trial court's findings are not 
adequately supported by the record). Thus, the court's legal conclusion on speeding is also 
erroneous. 
5
 Humphrey is aware that ,f[a]n appellant raising issues of fact on appeal must . . . 
marshall all the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, and then show that evidence to 
be insufficient." State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 734-35 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 
P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991). 
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The court's factual finding on the tail light violation is similarly erroneous. The 
trooper testified that when he passed the Fierro he did not immediately observe a tail light, 
apparently because "the rear of the vehicle was very dirty and muddy." R. 114. Right after the 
stop, the officer became convinced that the light was not illuminated because of the dirt and 
mud. See R.138. Accordingly, the alleged tail light violation is not a justifiable basis for the 
stop. See Talbot, 792 P.2d at 492 (once officer noticed defendant's vehicle had valid license 
sticker, reasonable suspicion no longer exists to justify stop); cf. Bello, 871 P.2d at 587 (single 
instant of weaving not a violation of statute requiring vehicles to be operated as nearly as 
practical entirely within single lane). 
Further, the encounter between Humphrey and trooper Eldredge took place during 
daytime, shortly after one o'clock in the afternoon. See R.138. As previous counsel pointed 
out at the suppression hearing, Utah law requires illuminated tail lights only between sunset and 
sunrise. R.171. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-118 (1995). Accordingly, the trial court's factual 
findings and conclusions of law with regard to the tail lights violation are erroneous. See Bello, 
871 P.2d at 587. 
The third basis articulated by the trial court as legitimizing the stop was the 
alleged front license plate violation. See R. 174. Admittedly Humphrey did not have the front 
license plate properly affixed to the Fierro. However, Humphrey believes that the court 
erroneously discounted his assertion that the "violation" was a fabrication (R. 171), by concluding 
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that Lopez has eviscerated the pretext doctrine (R.174). See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 
1140 (Utah 1994) (abandoning pretext doctrine in search and seizure). 
The trial court apparently overemphasized the demise of the "subjective intent" 
or "pretext" doctrine. The Lopez Court made clear that its "decision . . . should not be 
interpreted to mean that evidence of an officer's subjective intent. . . is never relevant to to the 
determination of Fourth Amendment claims." Id. at 1138. Thus, 
an officer's subjective suspicions unrelated to the traffic violation 
which he or she stops a defendant can be used . . . to show that 
the officer fabricated the violation. . . . The more evidence that 
a detention was motivated by police suspicions unrelated to the 
traffic offense, the less credible the officer's assertion that the 
traffic offense occurred. 
Id. at 1138-39. 
There is no question that the alleged license plate violation was concocted. Prior 
to the second stop, trooper Eldredge was aware that the occupants of the Fierro had just been 
cited by another trooper one hour earlier for the same violation. R. 108. Thus, this "violation" 
certainly was not of paramount concern to the trooper. Indeed trooper Eldredge candidly 
admitted that the second stop was meant to be a drug, as opposed to, a traffic stop. See 
R. 114,138 (Excerpted as Addendum III). Consequently, the trial court erred in ignoring 
evidence that the alleged license plate violation was motivated by police suspicions unrelated to 
the traffic stop. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1138-39. 
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In sum, no traffic violation occurred in the presence of trooper Eldredge to justify 
stopping the Fierro. Accordingly, the trial court's conclusion to the contrary should be reversed. 
See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1134 (if no traffic violation, stop not justified at inception and evidence 
must be suppressed). 
B. The drug-related stop lacked reasonable suspicion 
Because it is unsupported by a traffic violation, this Court must determine whether 
reasonable suspicion nonetheless justified the stop. 
The trial court found that Nicki's father, trooper Peterson, had told trooper 
Eldredge that his daughter was using methamphetamines and was involved with a Brad Davis 
who was also known to be a drug user and/or seller. The court also found that trooper Eldredge 
was aware that Humphrey and Nicki were travelling from a known drug source, Phoenix, 
Arizona, and that Humphrey uses an alias and was nervous when questioned about drugs. See 
R.188. However, the court was not "at all totally convinced" that the foregoing facts provided 
reasonable suspicion for the stop. Indeed, the court found that the drug trafficking allegations 
were nothing but a conjecture. See R.186, 188 (Addendum II). Nevertheless, the court 
concluded that these "facts," in the aggregate, supported reasonable suspicion for the stop and 
the officer was therefore justified in asking the defendant questions about drug use. See R.188 
& Addendum II. 
The trial court's reasonable suspicion findings, which evidently found the drug 
trafficking allegations conjectural, clearly belies its conclusions of law that the stop was a valid 
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drug stop and should therefore be reversed. See Case, 884 P.2d at 1278 (trial court's legal 
conclusion not supported by its own findings and is incorrect). 
There is no bright line test for determining the reasonableness of police suspicion. 
See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S. Ct. at 695; State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). However, the officer must be able to "point to specific, articulable facts which, 
together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person to 
conclude [defendant] had committed or was about to commit a crime." State v. Trujillo, 739 
P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).6 
Utah appellate courts have been called upon on numerous occasions to review trial 
courts' "reasonable suspicion" determination. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 935 (clarifying appellate 
review standard of reasonable suspicion determination). While the trial court's "reasonable 
suspicion" factual finding is entitled to deference, its conclusion of law is reviewed 
nondeferentially for correction of error. See id. at 939. 
In determining whether the police had reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist, this 
Court "looks to the totality of the circumstances present at the time the officer decided to stop 
the vehicle." Bello, 871 P.2d at 587. Accord Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S. Ct. at 695 
("Based upon that whole picture [totality of circumstances] the detaining officers must have a 
6
 Accord Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1879-80; State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774, 786 (Utah 1991); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 466 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 
P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992); State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
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particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal 
activity."). Cf. Poole, 871 P.2d at 534 (applying totality of circumstances test in determining 
probable cause for warrantless search).7 
Case, 884 P.2d at 1274, was a reasonable suspicion case decided by this Court. 
In Case, this Court found no reasonable suspicion where the officer who responded to a dispatch 
call about a possible car prowl "made no independent investigation or observations that would 
provide a separate basis for reasonable suspicion." 884 P.2d at 1279. Similarly, in Carter, 812 
P.2d at 460, this Court concluded that the bulge under defendant's clothing and his failure to 
produce identification constituted inadequate reasonable suspicion to justify his seizure. See id. 
at 466-67. In State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the police were conducting 
surveillance on a residence in Salt Lake City believed to be a drug house. The defendant drove 
up, parked her car and entered the house. Approximately three minutes later, the defendant 
exited the house and drove off. The police thereafter pulled her over. On appeal, this Court 
concluded that the defendant's single visit to the residence believed to be a drug house did not 
give rise to reasonable suspicion. Sykes, 840 P.2d at 829. See also Steward, 806 P.2d at 216 
(mere presence in targeted drug house not sufficient reasonable suspicion). 
7
 Although the required level of suspicion to support an investigatory stop is lower than 
that for probable cause, the same totality of circumstances analysis and appellate review 
standards govern the two. See Poole, 871 P.2d at 531; Case, 884 P.2d at 1276; State v. 
Contrel, 886 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
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The foregoing and other cases from this Court require the police to have 
reasonable suspicion and independently verify those suspicions prior to seizing a citizen. 
Phrased differently, to justify a seizure, the officer "'must point to specific, articulable facts, 
which together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person 
to conclude defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime.'" Carter, 812 P.2d at 
466. 
There is no dispute that trooper Eldredge made no independent verification of the 
drug trafficking tip provided by trooper Peterson. See R. 135 & Addendum III (trooper Eldredge 
admitting on cross-examination that he did not verify any of the information provided by trooper 
Peterson). Indeed, the trial court was unabashedly troubled by the conjectural nature of the 
reasonableness of trooper Eldredge's suspicion: 
[W]hat I cannot consider, I think, is that there is evidence that Mr. 
Humphrey was involved with drugs in Grand Junction. The best 
that we can say, as a factor to be considered is, that there is 
somebody in the police department or sheriffs office in Grand 
Junction that thinks Mr. Humphrey has something to do with 
drugs. But since it is not articulated as to some specific fact that 
indicates his involvement, that is a very slender weight to rely on. 
I don't know whether I can even place one of my toes on that in 
trying to find reasonable suspicion. 
R.186 & Addendum II. The court then goes on to find trooper's Eldredge's assertion that Nicki 
was getting methamphetamines from a Brad Davis as another "conjecture" not to be given any 
weight. See id. Those findings deserve deference in this Court. Pena, 869 P.2d at 936. 
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Further, that the uncorroborated tip relied upon by trooper Eldredge came from 
another trooper does not change the reasonable suspicion calculus: 
If the investigating officer cannot provide independent or 
corroborating information through his or her own observations, the 
legality of a stop based on information imparted by another will 
depend on the sufficiency of the articulable facts known to the 
individual originating the information or bulletin subsequently 
received and acted upon by the investigating officer. 
Case, 884 P.2d at 1277 (footnote and citations omitted). 
As the trial court correctly found, the drug-trafficking tip from trooper Peterson 
was pure conjecture and was uncorroborated by trooper Eldredge. Although trooper Peterson's 
hunch turned out to be correct, "a 'hunch,' without more, is not sufficient to raise a reasonable 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992); State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The remaining factors 
relied on by the court -nervousness and driving from a drug source- are not peculiar to 
criminal activity. See Sykes, 840 P.2d at 828; Lovegren, 829 P.2d at 158; Godina-Luna, 826 
P.2d at 655. Accordingly, the stop lacked reasonable suspicion. See Case, 884 P.2d at 1279. 
State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996), although involving probable cause 
to arrest, also provides guidance as to the level of suspicion needed to for a drug-related stop. 
The supreme court in Anderson applied the totality of circumstances test and found that the 
officers were justified in stopping Anderson on suspicions of drug trafficking. 
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In Anderson, the police received information from Anderson's former live-in 
girlfriend the day before the encounter that Anderson and another individual, Abbott, would be 
transporting methamphetamines to Utah from Las Vegas, Nevada. She advised that the two 
would be driving Anderson's Cadillac through Millard County via highway 257 and would return 
the following afternoon. She also said that Anderson would be armed. On the following day, 
another officer told the investigating officer that a second informant had stated that Anderson 
would be transporting methamphetamines from Las Vegas through highway 257 that afternoon. 
The informant also warned that Anderson would be armed. Further, several of the investigating 
officers had previously been in Anderson's house and were aware of his gun collection. See 
Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1230-31. 
Based on the foregoing, the investigating officer went to Anderson's house to 
verify that his Cadillac was not there. At about 2.30 p.m., the officers sighted Anderson's car 
on highway 257 and pulled him over, intending to conduct a warrantless search for contraband. 
Id. at 1231. A search of the Cadillac revealed some marijuana. The defendants were then 
arrested. The day after the arrest, while the Cadillac was at the impound lot, Abbott told the 
officers that methamphetamines were hidden underneath the carpet in the front passenger side 
of the vehicle. Id. 
On appeal, Anderson claimed that the warrantless roadside search of the Cadillac 
was not supported by probable cause. See id. The Court concluded that the information 
provided by the ex-girlfriend -the name of Anderson's companion, the make of the vehicle, the 
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route, date, and time that Anderson would be travelling— was sufficiently detail to establish her 
credibility. The court further reasoned that the information provided by the second informant 
was also sufficient detailed to be reliable. Coupled with the fact that the investigating officers 
"personally verified every aspect of the informants' report," the Court concluded that the officers 
had probable to stop and arrest Anderson. Id. at 1233. 
In this case, trooper Eldredge did not attempt to verify any of the information 
provided by trooper Peterson. Nothing was done to independently verify any of the hunches 
made by Peterson. Based on the foregoing, the drug-related stop was not supported by 
reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, the trial court's decision upholding the stop should be 
reversed. 
C. Unreasonable or Unlawful Detention of Humphrey Exceeded the Scope of the Stop. 
Even if the initial stop was a valid traffic stop, this Court must next consider the 
detention and determine "whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place." Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20.8 
Trooper Eldredge allegedly stopped Humphrey's vehicle for speeding, no front 
plate and rear tail light. R.114. Upon approaching the Fierro, Humphrey produced a valid 
driver's license as requested, and Nicki indicated to the officer that she had just been cited for 
8
 Accord State v. Chapman, _ P.2d , No. 930026, slip op. (Utah, July 19, 1996); 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132; Lovegren, 829 P.2d at 158; Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d at 654; Sepulveda, 
842 P.2d at 917. 
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the license plate violation. R. 115. The trooper then ordered Nicki out of the Fierro and began 
asking questions relating to drug use. R. 115. At this time, the trooper ran Humphrey's driver's 
license for warrants check. R. 116,126. By this time, too, approximately six minutes had 
elapsed since the stop. Further, at this time, Price, Utah, dispatch might have advised the 
trooper that there was no hold on Humphrey or the Fierro. R. 145. However, Trooper Eldredge 
did not issue a citation for any of the alleged traffic violations for which the Fierro was stopped. 
R.144. Thereafter, the trooper went back to the Fierro to speak to Humphrey about drug 
trafficking. It was at this point that Nicki requested Humphrey's jacket and the zylocane was 
discovered therein. R. 118. 
As mentioned earlier, the district court found that Humphrey was stopped for 
traffic violations. The court also found that the stop was pursuant to a valid drug-related 
suspicion. With respect to the detention issue, the court, though somewhat confusing, seems to 
have found that the detention exceeded the scope the traffic stop. See R. 184-85 (trial court 
indicating there are several problems with State's argument that scope of traffic stop was not 
exceeded).9 However, upon finding the seizure lawful based on a reasonable suspicion of drug-
related activity, the court proceeded to conclude that the detention was also lawful and the 
9
 That the trial court did not enter written findings and conclusions is not fatal. Sykes, 
840 P.2d at 828. However, to the extent this Court finds the trial court's findings and 
conclusions on the detention issue insufficient for meaningful appellate review, this case 
should be remanded for further findings. State v. Genovesi, 871 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994); State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 771 n.ll (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. 
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
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trooper was within the scope of the stop. See R.188 ("There was reasonable suspicion to 
continue the inquiry or to expand the scope of the inquiry or for it to initially have been an 
inquiry concerning drugs."). See also R.182 (Trial court stating, "From this point on [finding 
zylocane in Humphrey's jacket], I don't have a problem. If they get to this point all right 
without violating his rights, I think what happened after that is okay."). 
In determining whether the detention is appropriate as an investigatory stop, the 
inquiry is "'whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to 
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly....'"10 In other words, "'[t]he length and scope of 
detention must be "strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation 
permissible.'" State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 
19-20). Phrased differently, "once a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must be temporary and 
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 
(quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983)). "Any further 
questioning or detention on the part of the police, absent an articulable suspicion of other 
criminal activity, is illegal. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519-20 (10th Cir. 
1988)." Castner, 825 P.2d at 703. 
10
 United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 945 F.2d 415 
(1991) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985)); 
accord State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 702 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Carter, 812 P.2d at 466. 
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Humphrey concedes that if this Court finds that trooper Eldredge's actions were 
justified at the inception as a reasonable drug stop, then the trooper did not impermissibly 
expand the scope of that detention when he questioned Humphrey about drugs and discovered 
the zylocane. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (investigative detention not unconstitutional if 
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity arises). 
However, Humphrey, like the trial court, believes that the detention was 
impermissibly extended after the alleged traffic stop. In Lopez, the supreme court held that 
running a warrants check during the course of a routine traffic stop 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment, so long as it does not 
significantly extend the period of detention beyond that reasonably 
necessary to request a driver's license and valid registration and to 
issue a citation. 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133. 
This Court has similarly so held. In Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d at 652, an officer 
observed the defendants' car weave in and out of traffic lanes. Suspecting the driver might be 
intoxicated, the officer pulled the vehicle over. After stopping the vehicle, the officer concluded 
that defendants were not intoxicated. However, because they were nervous, the officer 
demanded the defendants' identification, which they promptly produced. He conducted an NCIC 
check, which turned out negative. Thereafter, he asked the defendants if they had firearms or 
narcotics in the vehicle. One defendant answered "No, but if you'd like to check, go ahead." 
The ensuing search revealed four kilograms of cocaine. See id., 826 P.2d at 654. 
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On appeal, the question was whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to 
further detain and question the defendants after discovering they were sober. This Court held 
that f,[o]nce the reasons for the initial stop have been satisfied, the individual must be allowed 
to proceed on his or her way." Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d at 654-655. "Although the deputy's 
hunch ultimately proved to be correct, a hunch, without more, does not raise a reasonable 
articulable suspicion regardless of the final result." Id. at 655. Accord State v. Robinson, 797 
P.2d 431, 436-37 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("In sum, we conclude that the trial court clearly erred 
in its finding that the troopers had the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to 
justify their continued detention and questioning of Robinson and Towers once the warning 
citation was given and the purposes of the initial stop had been accomplished."); Lovegren, 829 
P.2d at 159 (same); Castner, 825 P.2d at 703 (same). 
More recently, the Tenth Circuit addressed the reasonableness of detention 
following a routine traffic stop. See United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558 (10th Cir. 1994). 
McSwain was pulled over in Sevier County, Utah, by a state trooper because his vehicle had no 
front or rear license plates. As he approached the vehicle, the trooper noticed a valid temporary 
Colorado registration sticker. The trooper requested the driver's identification and registration. 
McSwain produced a Colorado registration in his name and told the officer he had no driver's 
license. His passenger, a Mr. Fisher, had a valid driver's license. The trooper conducted a 
radio check, revealing that McSwain had a suspended driver's license and had prior drug arrests. 
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At this point, the trooper returned McSwain's and then began to ask questions unrelated to the 
stop, obtained consent and searched McSwain's vehicle. See McSwain, 29 F.3d at 560-61. 
In reversing the district court, the Tenth Circuit held: 
Trooper Avery stopped Mr. McSwain for the sole purpose of 
ensuring the validity of the vehicle's temporary registration sticker. 
Once Trooper Avery approached the vehicle on foot and observed 
that the temporary sticker was valid and had not expired, the 
purpose of the stop was satisfied. Trooper Avery's further 
detention of the vehicle to question Mr. McSwain about his vehicle 
and itinerary and to request his license and registration exceeded 
the scope of the stop's underlying justification. 
McSwain, 29F.3dat561. 
The foregoing cases illustrate that Trooper Eldredge unreasonably detained 
Humphrey after the alleged traffic stop. As argued earlier, Humphrey had committed no traffic 
violation. Even if there was a traffic violation, the unlawful detention began, most 
conservatively, at the point the trooper obtained confirmation that Humphrey and the Fierro had 
no warrants holding them, which presumably had already been determined in the previous stop 
that day. At that point, Humphrey should either have been cited or allowed to proceed on his 
journey. The trooper should not have ordered the passenger, Nicki, out of the Fierro to ask 
questions relating to drug use. See Johnson, 805 P.2d at 761. Not allowing Humphrey to 
proceed on his journey at the point the trooper obtained the negative warrants hold, clearly 
constitutes an unreasonable detention and exceeded the scope of the alleged minor traffic 
violation. McSwain; Godina-Luna. Moreover, nervousness and failure to make eye contact with 
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the police are insufficient to demonstrate reasonable suspicion to detain a motorist. Robinson, 
791 P.2d at 436; State v. Hewitt, 841 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Accordingly, the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to further detain Humphrey 
after the alleged reason for the initial traffic stop had dissipated. See Castner, 825 P.2d at 703; 
Robinson, 791 P.2d at 436. The trial court's decision to the contrary should be reversed. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
This case is fact-sensitive and raises novel issues of search and seizure. Counsel 
believes oral argument will aid the Court in disposing the issues. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ day of July, 1996. 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
BRADLEY P. RICH 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Docketing 
Statement, postage prepaid, this day of July, 1996, to Jan Graham, Utah Attorney General 
and J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Division, Utah 
Attorney General's Office, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, and the Utah 
Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 East, #400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
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ADDENDUM I 
FINDINGS, JUDGMENT AND 
COMMITMENT ORDER 
R. 89-90 
CRAIG C. HALLS #1317 
San Juan County Attorney 
P. 0. Box 850 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Phone 587-2128 
. V L IJ i i i I ' K , \ » »r»> i \j ^J u I Ji , 
TILED r ' • '» ' <v - f ; 
BY. 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
Dapjty 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Criminal No. 9517-12 
THIS MATTER came before the Court for Sentencing on the 19TH 
day of JANUARY, 1996, before the above entitled Court, Craig C. 
Halls, San Juan County Attorney, attorney for State of Utah, and 
Defendant appearing in person and with his attorney, Bradley Rich. 
The Defendant agreeing to the arrangements made by counsel. 
Defendant pled guilty to COUNT No. 1: POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE, METHAMPEHTAMINE, A FELONY OF THE 2ND DEGREE; AND COUNT 
No. 4: POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON, A FELONY OF THE 3RD 
DEGREE. THE STATE DISMISSED ALL OTHER COUNTS. 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, 
that the Defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison to serve 
not less then one year nor more than 15 years on Count No. 1, and 
a term not to exceed five (5) years on Count No. 4:, sentences to 
run concurrent. 
Sheriff of San Juan County is directed to take him into 
custody and deliver him forthwith to the warden of the Utah State 
Prison. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the original of this Judgment and 
Commitment shall be attested to by the Clerk of the Court and that 
a certified copy hereof be delivered to said Sheriff or other 
qualified officer and that copy serve as the Commitment of the 
Defendant and of the Warrant for the Sheriff in taking into 
custody, detaining, and delivering said Defendant. 
ADDENDUM n 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 




listen to Exhibit No. 1 and the information that was 
available to the officer, as you listen to Exhibit No. 1, 
3 krou'll hear Trooper Eldredge himself in being involved in 





5 pet the individual on his way, he fabricated the search of 
6 [the coat. He then again fabricated the DUI and at that 
7 point, Your Honor, I think he was well beyond the 
8 Constitutional permissible scope, and I think it's necessary 
9 for the court to suppress any information from the stop and 
10 Ifrom the search 
11 I THE COURT: Mr. Halls, I'm going to save you 
12 [some time and direct your efforts to what I really want to 
13 hear about. It's pretty clear to me that with the pretext 
14 [rule announced by the supreme court that -- that there was 
15 [reasonable suspicion of some criminal activity, even a minor 
16 [traffic offense for these individuals to be stopped in the 
17 Ifirst place. It was either speeding, or having an obscure 
18 [tail light, which I think is illegal even if it's day time, 
rcou should have all of your equipment working property even 
20 during day time, because at least you need your break lights 
during the day time. Oh, and similarly, even though they had 
22 been stopped once before for the license plate violation, 
t's still a violation. They really should not have gone 
24 another mile further down the road without fixing the front 











obviously not visible and placing it out in front where it 
ftfould be visible. 
So, I don't have any problem with the initial stop being) 
based on reasonable suspicion. Similarly, once the Zylocane 
Las found, I don't think under all of the circumstances at 
least reasonable suspicion to believe that there drugs in the) 
vehicle to hold them long enough for the drug dog to get 
phere. So, I think the crux of this case is whether at the 
time the stop expanded being simply a traffic stop and maybe 
10 [it never was to becoming a — to an inquiry concerning drugs, 
11 Whether there was reasonable suspicion of further criminal 
12 activity beyond that observed with regard to the traffic 
13 [stop. Mr. Halls. 
14 I MR. HALLS: Your Honor, let me, I guess, talk 
15 about that this way. What the Court is focusing on is the 
16 traffic stop aspect of it, and I think it's clearly — 
17 essentially what the officer testified that he was going 65 
18 miles an hour, that we had no front plate, and that he had 
19 pail lights that were obscured. Now, we're not talking about] 
20 the lights being turned on. I agree with Mr. Schultz. But 
21 krou have to have your brake the lights visible, basically. 
22 Bo, I think we have a circumstance for a traffic stop, but wej 
23 pad every right to stop him. I can understand whether the 
24 court may have some concern about whether or not — what we 
25 bo at that point. And for that reason, I guess this is the 
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foray the state — and I don't want to completely abandon that, 
2 but basically I have a little different conception about what] 
3 |the case is about. 
If I — if I came to this court with the information 
5 [this officer had and asked for a search warrant, I'm not 
6 entirely, you know, I'm not convinced that the court based 
7 ppon statements of the father who knows the daughter and who 
8 has had a daughter who has called him up obviously on drugs 
9 and was threatening to kill him and his wife and herself, and| 
10 the father saying this girl is on drugs, she's been heavily 
11 bn drugs for this period of time, her former husband or 
12 roommate or whoever is in jail because of drugs. The current! 
13 person she's taken up with is a guy with a alias, who the 
14 people in Grand Junction are saying is involved in meth labs 
15 p.n Grand Junction. He calls himself Mr. Davis and his name 
16 [is really Bryan Humphrey, who under both of those names is 
17 known to be in the drug business in the Grand Junction area, 
18 pells him that she has been transporting drugs, and that they| 
19 pave now gone south; the officer seen them go south two days 
20 before, indicates to him that at this point they were 
21 brobably transporting drugs, I think that there may be enough] 
22 treasonable suspicion in that scenario from a father for this 
23 court to give a search warrant. All we really need to have 
24 Lis reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, which is 
25 necessary for a search warrant, but reasonable suspicion. 
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I would like to take it out of the context of a traffic 
[stop and say that we had reasonable suspicion to make this 
stop for drugs. We don't have to have a tail light out. We 
pon't have the thing swerving. We don't have to have it 
(going 60 miles an hour. 
THE COURT: So, you say these things: this 
[girl's father says she is a heavy user of drugs, and he bases] 
(that on some --
MR. HALLS: Observations of her. 
THE COURT: And her telling him — Did she 
11 pver tell him she was using drugs? 
12 | MR. HALLS: He knew that she was using drugs 
13 [The son knew she was using drugs for approximately a year and| 
14 he said she had been a heavy user for 6 months. We have 
15 (information with regard to the telephone conversation. We 
16 have another telephone conversation from somewhere in Cortez 
17 pr something where she was she was obviously — he says she 
18 was obviously high; told this officer that she was a constant) 
19 user; told this officer that she had been trafficking drugs 
20 tin the Arizona area; and now she's gone to Arizona with a 
21 person who is a known drug user, known drug trafficker, known) 
22 prug person in --
23 THE COURT: Well, I'm having a little trouble 
24 with that. Because all the testimony was, Mr. Halls, was 
25 that his name came up. Now, what am I supposed to do with, 
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"his name came up?" Suppose my name comes up, you know, 
btfhat did they say? See, I don't have any information about 
someone actually saying -- I have information that someone 
paid to an officer in Grand Junction who said to Andy 
Peterson who said to Trooper Eldredge "this guy furnished us 
the ephedrine; this guy helped us build our lab; this guy was) 
pelling the stuff that we make." But all I have is his name 
came up in connection with it, and that's not articulatable; 
lis it? 
MR. HALLS: Well, perhaps we didn't make it 
lear enough to perhaps even tell this officer enough 
[information* Part of the problem is some of the information 
that I know and we know now is basically information that 
we've established after the fact, which isn't really 
pertinent — 
THE COURT: Yeah, it doesn't really help me, 
because it has to be something you knew at the time. 
MR. HALLS: But, the circumstance was and I 
[think the officer at least said, maybe he didn't say enough 
f this, was that this individual — there had been a couple 
f drug labs taken down in Grand Junction, which Brad Davis 
land Bryan Humphrey was indicated to the people in Grand 
(Junction to be a party to --
THE COURT: This is a little bit irregular, 
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did rather than render conclusions or generalizations about 
pirn being involved in it, did Andy Peterson say to you 
anything specific about what it is Bryan Humphrey or Brad 
Davis was supposed to have done in connection with drugs 
pther than simply he's involved in them? 
TROOPER ELDREDGE: I've got it written down 
what he told me on the side of the road and that was that 
according to Sergeant Franklin of the Grand Junction of the 
Narcotics Squad, Brad Davis may have an alias of Bryan 
Humphrey. The Sergeant in executing search warrants on some 
meth labs and the defendant's name — names had come up as 
peing involved in those labs. 
THE COURT: See, that's the problem. That's 
bhat I'm having trouble with. It's not necessarily your 
pault, Trooper, but someone's name coming up, I have no way 
pf evaluating what that means. People need to be more 
specific and officers, especially when they're talking about 
things that may give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable) 
pause, need to be more specific and say, "So, and so said to 
me as we were executing a warrant on a meth lab, I 
interviewed one of the people that was arrested, and he said, 
'Yeah, Bryan Humphrey was involved in this." Bryan 
Humphrey — I think even involved. That carries a meaning 
when you're talking with someone. But came up as being 
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suspicion in some officer's mind or whether it was an actual 
witness who purported to have some knowledge. Go ahead, Mr. 
Halls. 
MR. HALLS: I understand what the court's 
boncern is there, basically, what does this officer know at 
[that point. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. HALLS: This officer takes it from Trooper] 
[Peterson that this person has been involved with whatever it 
means to me and you now, in a couple of drug labs in Grand 
[junction. That is at least reasonable suspicion that this 
person is involved in drug trade — in trafficking drugs 
generally speaking. I mean, I think those items along with 
[the other things he told him about his daughter; about the 
ircumstances involved with her drug use and the amount of it| 
[and the extent of it and the trafficking give him a 
treasonable suspicion to believe that at this time these two 
people are trafficking drugs. Now, I'll get off of that, 
because basically I think the Court can stop it's inquiry 
there, because basically what that brings you to is this: Ifj 
pe had reasonable suspicion to stop that vehicle for drugs 
[then he stops the vehicle for drugs, what he does after that 
is reasonable. It's not obtrusive. He asks the owner of the| 
ar to step out and he asks her about it. He has a right to 




















we do an alcohol offense, you have the right to say, "Where 
are you coming from, where are you going; let me see your 
driver's license, registration; let me see these things; I'm 
going to go back to the car and I'm going to run it. Have 
krou had anything to drink tonight?" Basically, he has the 
bight to delve for a reasonable period of time into whether 
pr not there may be drugs in this vehicle. Now, while he's 
doing that and he decides to get out and he gets some 
anformation from the driver of the vehicle. He goes back and| 
pe starts running that trying to determine because he's 
determined before this time, is this Brad Davis or is this 
Bryan Humphrey? Is he one or the other. And so we're going 
to look into that, and he's going to be there for the time 
period that it's going to take for that thing to occur. Then) 
pe has the right to get him out and say, because of the way 
pe's reacting and because of what I've been told about him, I] 
think he may be driving this vehicle under the influence of 
something, and I'm going to have him walk a line here and do 
19 pome field sobriety tests, which he failed. 
20 Now, what I'm saying is his actions were reasonable in 
21 [relationship to the drugs and they very well may be 
22 treasonable in relationship to the traffic offenses. So, with) 
23 hregard to the drugs, what he does at the last point, then he 
24 ttinds an injectable Zylocane, which is a — it says right on 
25 tit — Well, I'm not sure. But basically it's a prescription! 
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fcype thing. It's not something people can buy across the 
counter. It's not something that can be prescribed to me. 
It's something that's going to be prescribed to a medical 
doctor and dentist --
THE COURT: From this point on, I don't have a| 
problem. If they get to this point all right without 
Violating his rights, I think what happened after that is 
pkay. 
MR. HALLS: Okay. So, let me go back and pick] 
up this other thing. I think the arguments are somewhat the 
pame. If we make a traffic stop and we have — we have the 
pront license plat, we have the speed that he said he talked 
about. He said he gave him a warning. We got the tail 
LLights. During the time period we're running a regular check] 
pn this individual, we're asking the owner of the vehicle 
about drugs. They are not being detained for any time period) 
past anything from which it would be for a ordinary traffic 
ptop. I think that he has other suspicion based upon this 
other information that he has to ask this individual to get 
put and to do a field sobriety test. And I think based on 
phat the court can find that it was reasonable under both 
criteria. From those time periods, I don't think we 
necessarily expanded the purpose of the traffic stop. Even 
though he's not being stopped for DUI necessarily, the court 
can analyze it in much the same fashion. What happens if we 
79 
1 bet the father of an individual who calls up and says, "My 
2 daughter has been down at the bar; she's been there all day 
3 LLong; she's an alcoholic; she's drinking; she drinks every 
4 pay; she's with another guy that drinks every day or uses 
5 pome substance that alters their ability to drive, does that 
6 officer have reasonable suspicion to stop that person for DUl] 
7 even though all he sees when he passes him on the road is no 
8 [License plate, a speed of 60 miles an hour, no tail lights? 
9 t[ think that he does. So, if he's got that kind of 
10 [information that Nicki Vought is in that circumstance and Mr* 
11 Humphrey's in that circumstance, can't we also say that when 
12 pe stopped that vehicle on the side of the road, he has the 
13 tight to check to see if the person driving the vehicle is 
14 impaired? 
15 Now, -- Well, here again the information that we have 
16 pot after the fact, which I'm not going to go into, would 
17 [indicate to the Court that he was absolutely right when he 
18 paid that that person was impaired. But the circumstance is 
19 now is he's saying, "Okay, we're going to check to see what's) 
20 going to come up with regard to the person's driver's 
21 [License; we're going to check to see whether he's got any 
22 Warrants; and I'm going to go up there and see -- I'm going 
23 to get the guy out and talk to him, look into his eyes and 
24 pee whether he's — whether he looks normal." And, I don't 
25 think that that is an unjustifiable detention. I don't think] 
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1 that's expanding the scope. I think that is within the scope| 
2 bf the stop. And when he is now talking to this guy doing 
3 pield sobriety and deciding there is something wrong with 
4 buY/ he has the right to retain him. And it's in that time 
5 period that we get this (inaudible). Now, at that point, he 
6 pas additional suspicion. I'm not personally sure what kind 
7 bf -- what this would do to you if you injected it, whether 
8 p-t would make you high or if it would make it so you couldn't) 
9 prive. But an officer looking at injectable Zylocane is 
10 paying, "These two people's stories don't match. Something's] 
up there. This person has a drug here that he shouldn't 
have, 
per so far is that they're probably under the influence of 
something, because they usually are. Their history is that 
land so on. " 
THE COURT: Well, okay. 
MR. HALLS: All right. Thank you, Your Honor 
THE COURT: The — What I understand the 
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The information I have on him so far is — on him and 
19 state's argument is really two prongs. One of them is that 
20 there was a traffic stop here the scope of which is as far as| 
21 duration of time, had not expired by the time further 
22 reasonable suspicion had developed. There are two problems 
23 with that theory. One of them is that it has not been 
24 blearly established that the — that the duration of the 




















that were necessitated by the initial stop had — had not 
expired at the time these additional communiques had taken 
place. 
But, further, I read State vs. Castner to say that 
[regardless of whether you're taking more time, regardless of 
whether you're detaining them longer, you can't even go into 
and inquire about other areas unless you have reasonable 
suspicion to do so, reasonable suspicions developed at the 
fcime you make the inquiry. Now, I'm not sure I agree with 
that, but I understand it to be the necessary holding of 
state vs. Castner. And so, I think the state is left with 
the argument that there was reasonable suspicion to expand 
the scope to an inquiry of — concerning drugs, or for it to 
pave been initially an inquiry concerning drugs. And these 
are the things that — Well, there are certain things that 
cannot be taken into consideration. You cannot take into 
consideration that someone refused to a consent to search, 
ttf you do that then you're saying to people, you have two 
19 choices: You can consent to my search, in which case I will 
20 search. Or you can not consent, in which case I will take it| 
21 as a factor against you to be reasonable suspicion or 
22 probable cause. And there is an analogues case on that where] 
23 pomeone turning away from a road block cannot be considered 
24 LLn any way as an indication of suspicious activity, even 
25 
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ftnd we do that, I think, to protect the Constitutional Right 
[to say no. 
So, what we're left with here is — Oh, and what I 
bannot consider, I think, is that there is evidence that Mr. 
Humphrey was involved with drugs in Grand Junction. The best! 
that we can say, as far as a factor to be considered is, that] 
there is somebody in the police or in the police department 
br sheriff's office in Grand Junction that thinks Mr. 
Humphrey has something to do with drugs. But since it's not 
articulated as to some specific fact that indicates his 
LLnvolvement, that is a — that is a very slender weight to 
prely on. I don't know whether I can even place one of my 
[toes on that in trying to find reasonable suspicion. 
So, what we're left with is the father of the owner of 
Jthe vehicle and the passenger has very good reason to believe) 
that she's a heavy methamphetamine user. She has told him 
that she has transported drugs. She — she has had a 
romantic involvement with someone who is now in jail for 
prugs. I don't think I can consider that she is now getting 
prugs from some other source, because as far as I could tell, 
that is just — that's just his conjecture. That's a 
conclusion he reaches, and parents may feel very comfortable 
pn acting on these things, but judges cannot. The person 
he's involved with is someone that now — romantically 
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who may have an alias. Well, that's somewhat suspicious, 
phey were seen, or at least, she was seen going with someone 
tin the car going south towards Phoenix two or three days 
earlier, and she's now going north. There's some weight 
there. Phoenix is a place from which drugs are distributed 
throughout the United States. There's evidence of that. 
Mr. Humphrey had been so nervous that the dropped his ID whenl 
pe was stopped earlier that day. And that — Nervousness is| 
never alone justification for a — is never alone reasonable 
suspicion. But, I understand the court of appeals to say it 
may be a factor to be considered. And then if allow that the) 
[initial stop was proper as a traffic stop, there is the 
additional factor of the nervousness of Miss Vought who knew 
the officer that stopped her very well. And, in fact, — 
Well, knew here very well. The details of that are in 
evidence. The questions is whether that is -- whether all 
those factors are reasonable suspicion. And the question 
might be phrased, "If you knew this about someone, would it 
be reasonable to suspect that they had drugs?" Someone is 
always using — is a heavy user of drugs, has transported 
prugs, using — with someone using an alias, had been going 
towards a drug destination or a drug outlet two or three days] 
earlier and was now returning from that area — of course, 
there's lots of innocent things they could have been doing —| 
they're very nervous, are those things enough. And you know, 
1 LE've been going back and forth during this entire hearing as 
2 bo whether those things are enough, because another way you 
3 ban phrase it is, "Do we want police officers stopping people] 
4 every time they have these factors?" I don't think we want 
5 police officers stopping people just because they're heavy 
6 drug users. You don't get to stop people just because 
7 they're heavy drug users. You don't get to ask about drugs 
8 just because people are nervous. You don't get to stop 
9 people just because they were going south a few days earlier, 
10 pfou don't get to stop people just because they've admitted 
11 transporting drugs in the past. You don't get to stop people) 
12 just because they've used aliases in the past. But if you 
13 put all five of those factors together, where those things 
14 coincide, would it be permissible for police officers to 
15 ptop? Is there enough to support reasonable suspicion? And 
16 I'm not at all totally convinced — Well, I believe that I'nj 
17 bright about this, but I realize it's a very close call. I 
18 phink it is enough. 
19 Therefore, there was reasonable suspicion to continue 
20 phe inquiry or to expand the scope of the inquiry or for it 
21 to initially have been an inquiry concerning drugs. So, I 
22 deny the Motion to Suppress. 
23 Now, we've had — I think we've already had an 
24 arraignment and the defendant's entered pleas of not guilty. 
25 bf you want to set the trial date at this time, or do you 
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Q Okay. What did you do? 
A At that time, I proceeded southbound to try and 
[intercept the car thinking "maybe they're going to turn and 
bo up Triple 6 towards Colorado." I didn't know which way 
they was going to go. Andy told me — Trooper Peterson told 
be they possible would go that way, because they know that 
there's a lot of troopers and a lot of cops out on — from 
here to Moab and then from there to Grand Junction, and he 
felt that maybe they would go another route to try and "sneak] 
[their way around us" is how he put it. 
Q So, you observed the vehicle 20 miles north of 
tyonticello? 
A Yes. 
MR. HALLS: Objection, leading. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (by Mr. Halls) Well, what did you observe about 
(the vehicle? 
A I observed the vehicle traveling northbound with 
[its headlights on, no front plate, at about 60 miles per 
pour. As the vehicle passed, I watched in my rear-view 
mirror or in my side mirror, and I could see no taillights, 
put it looked -- it appeared the rear of the vehicle was very] 
pirty and muddy. I then turned and pursued the vehicle and 
based on my suspicion of the drug-related stuff that me and 
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Q Is that the only — Was the phone you — The 
[conversation you had with him, where did that occur? Was 
[that in your car, his car? 
A That was his car. 
Q And was that recorded? 
A No, it was just in his car. 
Q That wouldn't be monitored by Price? 
A No. That was face to face. 
Q Trooper, you had the conversation with Trooper 
[Peterson, a private conversation, and he tells you all these 
things about his daughter and her problems, that he believes 
she's on methamphetamines. Have you told us pretty much 
everything you recall about that conversation with Trooper 
Peterson? 
A Yes. 
Q After the conversation, you decide to do something 
[and that is to come southbound and stop that vehicle; is that] 
borrect? 
A That's correct. 
Q And why did you decide to do that? 
A Based on the information that Trooper Peterson give) 
be; that fact of what he told me about his daughter, what he 
pold me about Mr. Humphreys being associated — his name 
being brought up in all these drug instances; being — 






























, Utah 8453S 
(80tt 587-2351 
two days prior to that traveling southbound, and now they're 
back up traveling northbound; the fact that the area where 
they're coming from is a known drug outlet; the fact that 
when Trooper Collier did ask Mr. Humphreys to step out of the] 
jvehicle that he yelled at her telling her not to let him 
earch, knowing that's their Constitutional right, however, 
[that seemed a little bit suspicious to me. All these things 
(together. , 
Q It seems suspicious to you that someone invokes 
|their Constitutional Right? 
A In that case, yes. All these things together is 
ktfhat made me suspicious that they possibly were in 
[transportation of a drug. 
Q Well, the fact of the matter is you were coming 
blown to stop that vehicle because it didn't have a front 
[license plate; were you? 
A No, I was coming down to stop the vehicle upon 
[suspicion of the drugs. 
Q And, on your way down, did you do a warrant search 
t>n these individuals that Trooper Peterson told you about? 
A No. 
Q Did you do a vehicle inspection or check on any of 
[those things that Trooper Peterson told you about? 
A No. 




came available to you at that time that wouldn't have been 
available to you at the time that Trooper Peterson and you 
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A What information did I get? 
Q Yeah. Did you receive any other information that 
lyou didn't have at Crescent Junction that you couldn't have 
lused? 
A The information — No, not from anybody, I didn't| 
|get any information. 
Q All right. Tell me what you personally did to 
[contact a magistrate or get a search warrant or to get some 
authorization to stop that vehicle from the time you left 
[Trooper Peterson to the time that you — 
A I contacted Sergeant Hall to ask him to see if he 
(could get a search warrant. 
Q When did you contact Sergeant Hall? 
A I don't recall. It was somewhere within — He 
[knew I was trying to intercept the vehicle, but it was 
sometime between when I left Andy -- Trooper Peterson along 
bide the Interstate, somewhere right around in there. And I 
personally did not try to contact a magistrate. 
Q Did you have conversations — Tell me when you had) 
23 conversations with Trooper Hall. I'm sorry, Sergeant Hall? 
A Uh huh. 
































Hall about trying to get a search warrant or what efforts he 
had undertaken? 
A I believe somewhere along the line on the way down 
[there I talked — I remember talking to Trooper Randall, and 
u. believe talking to Sergeant Hall telling them a little bit 
about the situation that was going on. And I believe Andy -
prooper Peterson went to Crescent Junction and there with 
Lieutenant Rapage, I believe they called Sergeant Hall on the) 
phone and talked to him about the situation, also. 
Q You are aware of some phone conversations that 
(occurred that day? 
A Yeah, I believe between the Sergeant and 
[Lieutenant. 
Q Do you know why those went over the phone and not 
lover the radio? 
A Well, it's a lot easier to talk on the phone. 
Q How much time elapsed from the time that you left 
[Sergeant, excuse me, Trooper Peterson and the time that you 
Ifirst observed the vehicle 20 miles north of town here? 
A I don't recall what time it was when I left Trooper] 
(Peterson. It has been about an hour. 
Q About an hour? And at the time you observed the 
[vehicle, did you have a search warrant? 
A No. 
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pad a search warrant at that time? 
A At that time, no. I stopped him on what I just 
[explained. 
Q And that was for no front plate and for no tail 
[lights? 
A And the suspicion for the controlled substances. l| 
toas originally stopping them for the controlled substances, 
put these other crimes were there when I stopped them. 
Q So, when you came down 191, it was your intent to 
[stop them for controlled substances or your suspicion for 
pontrolled substances? 
A That's correct. 
Q And had they not had — Well, strike that. In 
|fact, that car had a front license plate on it; didn't it? 
A It had one in the window. 
Q All right. Did you observe that as you came down 
[the highway? 
A I looked at the front of it. I didn't look in the 
Window. I noticed that after we had — Well, I believe the 
pEirst time I noticed that was after we got the car back here 
|at the Sheriff's Office. 
Q When you observed the vehicle for the first time on| 
191, what time of day was it? 
A It was in the early afternoon, a little after 1 
clock. 
Q * 
